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Recent United States Supreme Court Interpretations of
the Law of Searches and Seizures
In 1885 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled1 that
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment 2 could not
be used in a trial against a defendant from whom it was taken.
Later this rule was repudiated in the case of Adams v. New York, 3
but, in 1914, in Weeks v. United States4 the inadmissibility of such
evidence was firmly established. From the time of the Weeks case
the rule has been a subject of great interest to law enforcement
officials, state tribunals, 5 and writers in the field of law. Recently
two interesting and significant opinions concerning this field of
law were handed down by the United States Supreme Court. These
opinions are of special interest to lawyers and law enforcement
officials in that they tend to shed light on how the federal courts
will construe the law of searches and seizures in the future. The
cases c6ncerned in these opinions were Davis v. United States6 and
Zap v. United States.
7
The Davis case found its setting in the gasoline rationing pro-
gram administered under the Office of Price Administration. The
government suspected the defendant, an operator of a filling station,
of making illegal sales of gasoline. O.P.A. officials, accompanied
by New York detectives, planned a trap. They purchased gasoline
at the defendant's filling station without the required coupons. The
attendant who made the sale was placed under arrest, and subse-
quently when the defendant appeared on the scene he was also
arrested. Then the officers checked the amount of gasoline that
the defendant had sold and counted the coupons in the banks at
the side of each pump. Upon finding a shortage of coupons, the offi-
cers inquired about the shortage and were informed that the de-
fendant had coupons to cover the shortage in his office on the
station premises. The officials demanded that they be shown the
coupons and the defendant refused. Upon the refusal, one officer
tried the door to the defendant's office; and, when it was found
to be locked, another officer went around to the rear of the office
where he turned his flashlight in the window and appeared to be
trying to force the window open. At this point the defendant
consented to open the door. An inspection of the office revealed
that the defendant had illegal gasoline ration coupons in his posses-
sion. The coupons thus discovered were taken by the officers; and,
I Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885).
2 U.S. Const. Amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but on
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized."
3 192 U.S. 585 (1903) (The court bases the opinion on authority
which expressly upholds the common law rule and says that it will
not inquire into the source of evidence).
4 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (The Adams case is distinguished on the
ground that the preliminary motion disposes of the collateral issue and
that the seizure was made by state officials; rule of exclusion reestab-
lished).
5 Since the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution does
not apply to the several states the decision of the United States Supreme
Court did not apply to them. Though many of the state courts adopted
the federal rule, a majority of the state courts still adhere to the
common law rule. See notes, 88 A.L.R. 348, 134 A.L.R. 819, and 150
A.L.R. 566 where the different states are listed according to the rule
they follow.
6--U.S.-, 66 S. Ct. 1256 (1946).
7---U.S.- , 66 S. Ct. 1277 (1946).
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upon trial of the defendant for possession of illegal coupons, they
were admitted into evidence against him. This was done after
denial of the defendant's motion, prior to trial, for return of the
coupons,8 and the presentation of the coupons was allowed on the
ground that the defendant consented to the search and seizure. In
sustaining the trial court's conviction, the Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the search of the defendant's office was reasonable as an
incident of the arrest, but expressed doubt concerning the defend-
ant's consent to the search and seizure.
9 Upon appeal to the
Supreme Court the conviction was upheld by a five to three deci-
sion. The Court ruled that under the circumstances the trial court's
finding of consent should not be disturbed, that where there is a
seizure of public documents at a place of business during business
hours, duress and coercion would not be so readily implied as where
the search and seizure involved private papers and effects or were
performed in a home instead of a place of business.
10
The dissenting opinion severely questioned the majority's inter-
pretation of the word consent and criticized the majority's distinc-
tion between public and private documents and between places of
business and private residences. The dissent went on to add that
the majority were destroying the protection afforded by the Fourth
Amendment through a process of "devitalizing interpretation."
The Zap case, while concerning a similar question of law, pre-
sented a different set of facts. It involved an aeronautical engineer
who was working under a contract to do experimental work for the
Navy Department. The cost-plus contract contained a clause placing
the contractor's books and records open to government inspection.
The defendant had submitted a false claim for costs. During a
routine inspection the check evidencing the fraud on the govern-
ment was discovered: It was taken by the inspecting officers and
used against the defendant when he was on trial. The inspection
had been made partially during the defendant's absence, and when
he returned he protested to the inspecting officials. When the offi-
cials requested the check it was delivered to them by one of the
defendant's employees. Later a warrant was sworn out for the
defendant's books and papers, but it was admittedly defective in
that it failed to show the necessary and probable cause for belief
that the defendant was guilty of a crime. The defendant, convicted
8 The motion before trial for return of illegally seized evidence was
supposed to eliminate the objection caused by raising a collateral issue
during a trial. It had its inception in the Weeks case. See, supra, note
4 and Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
9United States v. Davis, 151 F (2d) 140 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1945).
10 Wilson -. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) and Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885) are cited by the court as distinguishing
between public and private documents. In the first of these cases, the
court established a rule that a person holding public documents has a
duty which overrides his claim of privilege. The Boyd case, quoting from
Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 329 (1841) says that where
certain articles, among which are books required to be kept for inspection
by the law, are held by private individuals the right of the government
exempts them from the doctrine of searches and seizures. In the Davis
case, however, the court, while citing these two cases, sums up its remarks
by saying, "Duress and coercion will not be so readily implied in the
case of public documents . .. as where private property is concerned."
Thus instead of totally excluding public property from the doctrine
of searches and seizures, the Court seems to set up a presumption that
duress and coercion are not used where public documents are involved.
This being so it would seem that the defense could have presented
evidence to rebut this presumption.
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by the lower federal court, appealed on the ground that his consti-
tutional rights had been invaded by the seizure and use of the
check in evidence against him. The Supreme Court, in a five to
three decision, upheld the conviction on the ground that the de-
fendant had waived his constitutional rights respecting searches
and seizures by entering into the contract containing the inspection
clause.
The dissenting opinion agreed that the government had a right
to inspect the defendant's books. It held, however, that a difference
exists between the right to search and the right to seize. It main-
tained that the principle allowing seizure of criminally held articles
discovered during a lawful search does not apply where, as in this
case, the articles are lawfully held.
The rules set out in these two cases are notable because they
represent a change in the criteria used by the Supreme Court to
determine whether searches and seizures are reasonable. In doing
this the court has been criticized for weakening the strict rule of
inadmissibility which has previously been used to enforce the
Fourth Amendment. To support its holding that there is a dif-
ference between private property and public property, the Court in
the Davis case cites authorities for this distinction."1 An examina-
tion of these authorities, however, reveals that the problem in one
of them, the Wilson case, concerned the amenability of corporate
records12 to the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Another, Boyd v. United States, decided an unrelated question,'3
and the part of that opinion referred to by the majority to make
the distinction is mere obiter. As a matter of fact, it is a quotation
from Commonwealth v. Dana,14 a case from a jurisdiction which
does not pretend to follow the rule of inadmissibility used in the
federal courts, and a case which is noted for expressly supporting
the common law rule of admissibility. The Court refers to Wigmore
as an authority for the difference between public and private prop-
erty.' 5 Wigmore makes the distinction, but it is noted that the
distinction is made in relation to the Fifth Amendment, and the
section of the treatise to which the majority refers deals with this
subject. The authorities either are- based on obiter or concern
themselves with the problem of corporate and public articles as
related to the privilege against self-incrimination. With them, the
Court establishes a rule applicable to the Fourth Amendment. In
previous cases the Supreme Court has held that the privilege of
the Fourth Amendment extends to all property regardless of its
11 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885); Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §2259c.
12 The rule is that a corporation, being a creature of the state, can-
not claim the privilege of the Fifth Amendment for its books and records.
A similar rule has been held to apply to government property and
records required to be kept by the government. This immunity has been
applied, however, only to the Fifth Amendment. See United States v.
Mulligan 268 Fed. 893 (D.C.N.D. N.Y. 1920) and Wigmore, Evidence
(3rd ed. 1940) §2259b and §2259c.
13 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885) (a case concerning
a statute requiring a defendant to produce his private books and papers
in court upon a motion by a government attorney or else the court
would take the allegations of the attorney as confessed. While concerned
mainly with the self-incrimination clause the court held that such a
statute violated both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments).
142 Metc. (Mass.) 329 (1841).
15 Supra note 6 at 1260.
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nature,16 and the court has even gone so far as to point out the
difference between the immunity of public and corporate property
to self-incrimination and the protection given to this property by
the Fourth Amendment.17 In the Davis case the majority opinion
said that the fact that the search and seizure occurred at a place
of business during business hours makes the case different from
Amos v. United States.5 It, however, does not cite authority for
the distinction between places of business and private homes. The
Court establishes a new criterion for search and seizure cases by
adding a factor which previously was not taken into consideration
to establish the legality of a search and seizure.19 The ruling in
the Zap case also makes a change in the court's previous stand.
It overlooks the distinction which the court has made between
legality of a search and legality of an accompanying seizure.20- The
cases which the Court cites to support its ruling hold that a seizure
of property which is illegally held during a lawful search is per-
missible, but they do not decide the present case where articles
which are lawfully held are seized during a legal search.21
In reality the rules in the Davis and Zap cases fit in with the
general pattern of the Supreme Court's decisions. The effect of
the rules is to restrict the rule of inadmissibility found in the
Weeks case. This may seem novel to newcomers in the search and
seizure field, but it is actually a continuation of the evolution that
the basic rule in the Weeks case has experienced since its entry
into American law. Since 1914, when the Weeks case was decided,
the Court has placed many restrictions on the rule.22 Whether the
rules in the Davis and Zap cases and the previous restrictions on
the rule of inadmissibility are beneficial or not is open to debate.
The purpose of the restrictions on the basic rule seems to have
been to relax the restraints on law enforcement and to thus enable
a greater degree of cooperation between the courts and law enforce-
16 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (The privilege under
the Fourth Amendment remains whatever the character of the paper) ;
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis J., dissenting,
said that unjustified search and seizure violates the Fourth Amend-
ment regardless of the character of the paper).
17 Silverthorn v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) ("The rights
of a corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected
even if they be not protected by the Fifth Amendment from compulsory
production of incriminating documents").
18255 U.S. 313 (1920) (Seizure of illegal liquor after search upon
being admitted to defendant's home and store by wife; held unreason-able).19 Silverthorn v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (Documents
seized in office; aeld illegal search and seizure) ; Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298 (1921) (Articles taken from office; "The security and
privacy of the home or office and papers of the owner" is guaranteed) ;
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1930) (papers
taken from defendant under false warrant at his office, during business
hours; held unreasonable); United States v. Lefkowitz, 295 U.S. 452
(1932) (search and seizure of office, illegal).
20 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
21 In re Sana Laboratories, 115 F(2d) 717 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1940) (Right
to inspect, evidence seized, articles suppressed) ; Paper v. United States,
53 F (2d) 184 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1931) (illegally held liquor seized during
search for defendant with warrant for his arrest, admissible); United
States v. Old Dominion Warehouse, 10 F(2d) 736 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1926)
(Illegally held alcohol seized while lawfully on premises, seizure not
unreasonable).
22 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §2184a. The author lists
the various exceptions to the rule of inadmissibility and makes a com-
plete list of cases by states indicating the holding in each.
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ment officials in the conviction of guilty persons. If we are to
accept the basic rule of inadmissibility as a permanent fixture in
the jurisdictions which have adopted it, the Court's action would
seem to have merit. In view of the indirect way in which the
Court has attacked and weakened the rule in the Weeks case, how-
ever, it seems that it would be appropriate for the Court to recon-
sider the rule and possibly discard it altogether. Aside from the
fact that for a century after the adoption of the United States
Constitution the courts of this country adhered to the common law
rule which admitted evidence without regard to the manner in
which it was obtained, there are some very good arguments for
direct action in discarding the basic rule of inadmissibility alto-
gether. The course that the Court has chosen to follow in the law
of searches and seizures has resulted in unnecessary complication.
It has also resulted in confusion among the lower courts due to
their inability to foresee new exceptions which the Supreme Court
might see fit to adopt. Furthermore the relevance and competency
of the evidence is not affected by the manner in which it is pro-
cured. The rule of inadmissibility is a negative effort to protect
people from wrongful invasion of their privacy by rendering evi-
dence useless which is not seized in compliance with the Fourth
Amendment. While this gives a certain amount of protection to
law abiding citizens, it places a burden on society by releasing the
guilty when their conviction is dependent upon the use of evidence
thus obtained. Under present conditions, where we find criminals
so ably equipped to evade the law in other respects,23 the extra
burden which the rule creates outweighs the benefit that it renders
to society. It is submitted that there is ample reason for abandon-
ing this negative form of protection and returning to the protec-
tion afforded by the common law or establishing another positive
form of relief24 to protect the innocent without placing such a
burden upon the public. 25 At present a majority of the states adhere
to the common law rule, and in recent years this rule has been
adopted or reaffirmed by several states which have reviewed this
question.
28
In discussing the holdings in the Davis and Zap cases, the rules
and reasoning behind them have been analyzed. There is, however,
another feature found in the majority and minority opinions of
both cases which deserves attention. In each of the cases the
majority and minority repeat the historically inaccurate rule that
admission into trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
23 Knox, Self-incrimination (1925) 74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 139.
24 Etnick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765); Paxton's
Case, Quincy's Mass. Reports 51 (1761). The remedy in these cases
was in an action in trespass against the offending officers. New Mexico
v. Dillon, 34 N. M. 366, 281 Pac. 474 (1929) suggests the same remedy.
Statutory provisions may exist for imprisoning or fining offending
officers. This is not considered very expedient, however, as the action
would have to be initiated by the state and in many cases by one
superior to the offending officer.
25 Much in the way of criticism of the rule of inadmissibility has
been written. For thorough discussions see: Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed.
1940) §2184 and §2184a; Harno, Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search
and Seizure (1925) 19 Ill. L. Rev. 303.
26 State v. Frue, 58 Ariz. 409, 120 P. (2d) 793 (1942); McIntyre
v. State, 190 Ga. 872, 11 S. E. (2d) 5 (1940); New Mexico v. Dillon,
34 N.M. 366, 281 Pac. 474 (1929); People v. Richters Jewelers, 291
N.Y. 161, 51 N.E. (2d) 690 (1943); State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St.
166, 2 N.E. (2d) 490 (1936).
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Amendment destroys the accused person's rights under the self-
incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment.27 This principle
began in Boyd v. United States. It calls the Fifth Amendment to
the aid of the Fourth Amendment to give the courts a further
ground to exclude from trial testimony procured in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. This doctrine in its inception also used the
Fourth Amendment to aid the Fifth by calling any evidence which
was self-incriminating a violation of the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The latter, however, has been repudiated,
and only the rule as stated in the Davis and Zap cases remains. 28
The rule was unnecessary and illogical in its inception. The Fourth
and Fifth Amendments were included in the Constitution to guard
against two separate evils. The Fourth resulted from the feeling
against the general warrants and writs of assistance used by the
British during the period preceding the American Revolution. The
Fifth Amendment arose from ideals formed as a reaction to forced
examinations of the accused and the Star Chamber practices. 29
From the wording of the Fifth Amendment it is seen that the
principles of the self-incrimination clause were not meant to apply
to a situation arising under the Fourth Amendment. The purpose
of the Fifth Amendment is to protect witnesses from being com-
pelled to testify against themselves in a criminal case. The amend-
ment says no more. In other words protection is given to a person
while he is acting in the capacity of a witness upon the stand, or
while he is acting under a process which treats him as a witness.
In the cases involving illegal searches and seizures the articles are
not obtained under a process which treats the accused as a witness,
nor does evidence thus obtained amount to a self-incrimination of
the accused on the witness stand.3 0 Therefore the statements made
in the majority and minority opinions in the Davis and Zap cases
regarding the interplay between these two amendments are just as
incorrect as in the early cases in which they were uttered. In each
of these cases the question was solely one concerning search and
seizure and the ruling could have been made purely on the basis
of the Fourth Amendment. In neither of the cases can it be said
that the seizure and use of the evidence was treating the defendant
as a witness under the meaning of the self-incrimination clause.
In spite of the criticism to which these cases lend themselves,
it is well to sum up their meaning and to estimate the possible
effect they will have on future search and seizure cases. As long
as they stand unreversed among the opinions of the Supreme Court,
they remain the law.3 ' To law-enforcement officials the rule seems
2 7 Supra r' )te 6 at 1258 and note 7 at 1279. The court makes the
statement that, "The law of searches and seizures . . .is the product of
the interplay of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments."
2
8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §2264.
29 Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-incrimina-
tion Clause (1930) 29 Mich. L. Rev. 1 & 191.
30 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 213, 150 N.E. 585 (1926); State v.
Frye, 58 Ariz. 409, 120 P. (2d) 793 (1942); State v. Barela, 23 N.M.
395, 168 Pac. 545 (1917); Calhoun v. State, 144 Ga. 679, 87 S.E. 893
(1916); Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §2264.
31 Neuslin v. Dist. of Columbia, 115 F (2d) 690 (Ct. of App. D.C.
1940). In looking for future trends in this field it is interesting to note
a holding by a member of the court who has taken his place on the
bench since the Davis and Zap cases were decided. The opinion by the
then Justice Vinson considers a search and seizure case and holds to
the strict rule of inadmissibility followed by the federal courts.
